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FEDERAL TAXATION: "CONVENIENCE OF THE
EMPLOYER" RULE APPLIED TO LODGING ON
PROPERTY NOT CONTIGUOUS TO PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BUSINESS
U NDER SECTION 119 of the Internal Revenue Code, an employee
may often exclude from gross income the value of free meals and
lodging which are provided without charge by his employer. One
requirement of this section is that the meals or lodging be furnished
on the "business premises" of the employer. In interpreting this
provision for the first time, the Tax Court in Charles N. Anderson'
found that the business premises is not confined to the physical
limitations of the employer's place of business.
In Anderson, a motel corporation had furnished its manager
with rent-free lodging so he could remain available for duty on a
twenty-four hour basis. Despite the fact that this lodging was located
two blocks away from the motel, the court found that it was on
the "business premises" of the corporation for purposes of section
119.2 Since the other requirements of that section were also satis-
fied, the court allowed the employee to exclude the rental value of
the house.3
From its inception in 1919,4 the "convenience of the employer"
rule5 has been justified by courts and administrators on the basis
142 T.C. 410 (1964).
ad. at 411-12.
aThe employer paid for the taxpayer's utilities and maid service. These were
deemed by the court to be part of the lodging and hence their value was exclud-
able. Id. at 417-18. The employer also furnished some meals to the taxpayer at the
lodging. Having found the lodging to be on the "business premises" and by further
finding that the meals were furnished for the convenience of the employer, the court
also allowed exclusion of the value of these meals. Id. at 418.
'The rule appears to originate from O.D. 265, 1 CuM. BuLL. 71 (1919). "Board
and lodging furnished seamen in addition to their cash compensation is held to be
supplied for the convenience of the employer and the value thereof is not required
to be reported in such employees' income tax returns." Ibid.
See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215 (1962).
In this casenote the term "convenience of the employer" rule, or "convenience"
rule, refers to the Policy of exclusion of meals and lodging, regardless of the tests
used in applying it. While this is in accord with some authorities, see, e.g., Annot.,
84 A.L.R.2d 1215, 1217 (1962), others use the term to mean the test of convenience
to the employer, see, e.g., Landman, The Taxability of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXES 173
(1955), and still others apparently use the term in both senses, see, e.g., Gutkin &
Beck, Some Problems in "Convenience of the Employer," 36 TAXaS 153 (1958).
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that meals and lodging furnished employees are often necessary
working conditions of employment, rather than income. 6 Prior to
1950, the usual test for applying the rule to allow exclusion of the
value of free meals and lodging was whether they were furnished
primarily for the employer's convenience.7 By 1950, however, the
Commissioner had apparently become dissatisfied with this test for
the reason that some employees were being allowed to exclude es-
sentially compensatory benefits." In that year, therefore, he an-
nounced that an exclusion would not be allowed if it could be
determined that the meals or lodging were furnished essentially as
compensation, and that only in cases where this could not be de-
termined would the original "convenience" test be applied.0 This
modification did not meet with unanimous judicial approval, and a
conflict developed among the courts as to the proper application of
the "convenience" rule.10
In 1954, Congress attempted to end the confusion caused by
the Commissioner's 1950 modification by passing Section 119 of the
-Internal Revenue Code.1 That section provides:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of
any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the con-
venience of the employer, but only if-
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept
such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a con-
dition of his employment.
The Regulations interpret this statutory language to mean that the
value of lodging will be excluded from gross income12 only if three
6 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552, 567, 569 (1925); Mim. 5023, 1940-1
Cum. BULL. 14; Treas. Reg. 45, art. 33 (1918), as amended, T.D. 2992, 2 Cum. BULL.
76 (1920); Landman, supra note 5, at 176; McDermott, Meals and Lodging Under the
1954 Code, 53 MICH. L. REv. 871-72 (1955); Annot., A.L.R.2d 1215, 1220 (1962).
7E.g., Mira. 5023, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 14, Hazel W. Carmichael, 17 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 239 (1948); see McDermott, supra note 6, at 872-73; Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215,
1230-32 (1962).
8 See Landman, supra note 5, at 178.
9 See Mim. 6472, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 15.
LO Compare Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953), with Diamond v. Sturr, 221
F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1955) (rejecting the modification as inconsistent with long
established Regulations and case law). See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215, 1230-31 (1962).
L' "The House and your committee has adopted provisions designed to end the
confusion as to the tax status of meals and lodging furnished an employee by his
employer." S. RE'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
'2 Gross income is broadly defined in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a); subsequent
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separate tests are met: the lodging must be furnished for the con-
venience of the employer; the employee must be required to accept
such lodging as a condition of employment; and the lodging must
be on the business premises of the employer.13 If these tests are
met, the exclusion is allowed irrespective of whether the lodging
constitutes "compensation."' 14 This construction of section 119 is in
accord with the plain meaning of the statute and finds some support
in the language of the Senate Report which accompanied the bill.'5
Under this interpretation of the section, an employee could qualify
under the "convenience" test and still be denied the exclusion for
failure to meet the "business premises" test.
The Anderson case is significant in that it is the first Tax Court
case in which the principal issue was whether the lodging in ques-
tion was on the "business premises."16 The court had little diffi-
culty finding that the house was furnished for the employer's con-
venience and that the employee was required to accept it as a
condition of his employment.' 7 These tests had been judicially in-
sections contain specific inclusions and exclusions in computing this sum. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 71-78, 101-121. Meals and living quarters provided by an employer
which do not qualify under § 119 are items of gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (3)(1957).
"ITreas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6745, 1 P-H 1964 FED. TA Es
8683.
1 Ibid.
I "[T]here is excluded from the gross income of an employee the value of meals
or lodging furnished to him for the convenience of his employer whether or not such
meals or lodging are furnished as compensation.... In the case of lodging the exclu-
sion is permitted only if the employee is required to accept the lodging on the
business premises of the employer .... " S. RFP. No. 1622, supra note 11, at 190. See
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954). While three separate tests are
indicated, this does not necessarily imply that there is no interrelation between the
tests or that all three tests are of equal importance. See note 23 infra.
"0 Only one other case has considered the precise issue involved in the instant
case. In United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963), the court held that
the "business premises" of the state highway patrol extended to all the highways of
the state, and therefore patrolmen could exclude the value of meals eaten at restau-
rants along the highways. There, however, the court did not attempt to analyze the
meaning of the business premises test.
The Court of Claims in United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United
States, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX RFP. (64-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9637 (Ct. Cl. July
17, 1964), briefly discussed the "business premises" test, but resolved the issue easily
by finding that the house in question was on the "business premises" because the
employee carried on his work in the house itself. This argument was also advanced
by the taxpayer in Anderson. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17. The court apparently
rejected this contention, because it is not discussed in the opinion.
In two other Tax Court cases, the "business premises" test was briefly discussed
but not analyzed. John L. Nolen, P-H TAX Cr. REP. & MEm. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.) 64,099 (April 17, 1964); Mary B. Heyward, 36 T.C. 739, 743 (1961).
"The Service apparently did not seriously contend that these tests had not been
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terpreted both before and after passage of section 119.8 However,
prior to 1954 the "convenience" rule had never included a "busi-
ness premises" requirement,9 and it was therefore necessary for the
Anderson court to apply the "business premises" test according to
its reading of legislative intent.
The only description of the term in the reports accompanying
the bill is found in the Conference Committee Report, which ex-
plains the Senate substitution of "business premises" for "place of
employment" as follows: "The term 'business premises of the em-
ployer' is intended, in general, to have the same effect as the term
'place of employment' in the House bill."20 This paucity of legis-
lative explanation would permit a variety of interpretations. Thus,
an attempt should be made to analyze the congressional purpose
regarding the section in its entirety in order to arrive at a consistent
construction of the "business premises" test.21
In passing section 119 Congress rejected the restrictive 1950
modification of the Commissioner,22 and indicated instead that the
"convenience" test was to be the primary criterion for determining
allowance of the exclusion.23 Since Congress has apparently rele-
gated the "business premises" test to a position of secondary im-
portance, it seems reasonable that it should not be rigidly applied
where the employee clearly meets the pimary criterion.24 A liberal
met. 42 T.C. at 415. Even so, the court discussed these tests in relation to tile facts
at hand and found them to be fully satisfied. Ibid.
18 See, e.g., Mary B. Heyward, 86 T.C. 739, 743 (1961); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215,
1219-25 (1962).
19 See, e.g., administrative regulations and rulings supra, notes 4, 6, 9; Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 1215, 1225 (1962).
In at least one pre-1954 case, an exclusion was allowed when the employee did
not live on the "business premises" under any reasonable interpretation of that term
as used in § 119. Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925) (exclusion allowed
where army officer lived away from base).
20 H.R. RE'. No. 2543, supra note 15, at 27.
2' The opinion itself does not state this conclusion. However, the court alludes
to the congressional history and apparently recognizes that legislative intent is a
controlling factor. 42 T.C. at 416-17.
22 Congress recognized that meals and lodging were not excludable if furnished as
compensation under the Commissioner's 1950 announcement. S. REP. No. 1622, supra
note 11, at 19; see 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11.16, at 60 (1961 revision);
Landman, supra note 5, at 188-89; McDermott, supra note 6, at 875-76; Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 1215, 1231-32 (1962).
22 "Your committee has provided that the basic test of exclusion is to be whether
the meals or lodging are furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer (and
thus excludable) or whether they were primarily for the convenience of the employee
(and therefore taxable)." S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 11, at 19. But see note 15 supra.
2" "But there will be many times when the courts will find that common sense
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application seems even more justifiable in light of the legislative
development of the "business premises" test. The ambiguity of the
term "place of employment"2 5 in the House bill indicates that a
strict meaning was not intended. The examples given in the House
Report show that the exclusion was to apply to institutional em-
ployees, whose quarters are frequently furnished in separate build-
ings;20 thus the exclusion was not to be limited to the precise work
area of the employee.
The Senate changed this term to "on the business premises,"27
without indicating the reasons for this change.28 However, the same
examples of institutional employees are used in the Senate Report;29
thus it can be said that a restrictive definition was not intended.
The Conference Committee indicated that the terms were very simi-
lar in effect, and two further examples of the coverage of "business
premises" were provided: a domestic servant furnished lodging in
his employer's home, and a cowhand furnished meals on land simply
leased by his employer.30
The tenor of all these legislative examples seems to show a con-
says that meals and lodgings are furnished for the convenience of the employer, but
they are furnished at a place which the employer does not own or lease .... Obviously
the 'convenience of the employer' rule should be applied in such cases, but the courts
will have an interesting time explaining why these sites constitute 'business premises
of the employer.'" Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1215, 1225 (1962).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 11, at 18.
20"A civil service employee of a State is employed at an institution and is re-
quired, as a condition of his employment, to live and eat at the institution .... " Id.
at A39. Although the term "at the institution" does nothing more than say "at the
place of employment," Congress must be deemed to have realized that institutional
employees often live in separate buildings on the same plot of land as the institution.
See, e.g., Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374, 375 (1953); Diamond v. Sturr, 116 F. Supp.
28, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955). Thus, the selection of this
example indicates that Congress cannot have intended to restrict the "business
premises" to the exact situs of work.
17 See S. REP'. No. 1622, supra note 11, at 190.
28 The most probable explanation is that the Senate believed the term "place of
employment" might be interpreted too restrictively. This was the view of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in a memorandum which it submitted to the Senate Finance
Committee, reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R.
8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 485 (1954).
If this was in fact the reason for the change, the use of both terms interchangeably
in the report would seem to be merely an oversight on the part of the Committee.
See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 11, at 19.
20 S. RFP. No. 1622, supra note 11, at 191.
"See H.R. REP'. No. 2543, supra note 15, at 27. The inclusion of these examples
was probably the result of discussion in the Conference Committee on which of the
two terms was the better. While use of "place of employment" would negate the
need for these two examples, the Senate may have urged "business premises" for the
reason stated in note 28 supra.
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gressional concern merely for proximity of the lodging to the place
of work, and an intention to allow exclusion only when the em-
ployee is living in quarters which serve a business purpose of the
employer.31 In light of these examples, any attempt to define rigid,
physical standards delineating the "business premises" seems clearly
contrary to congressional intent. Thus, mere physical separation
becomes a secondary issue. The primary consideration would appear
to be whether the lodging is close enough to that business area of
the employer at which the employee is engaged to justify a con-
clusion that it is an integral part of the business premises.3 2 This
conclusion would depend, of course, on the facts in each individual
case.
This analysis of congressional purpose seems to accord with the
view taken by the Tax Court in Anderson. The court's decision
indicates that the "business premises" test should be liberally inter-
preted when the "convenience" and "condition of employment"
tests are clearly met.33 The court found that the house in question
was "business property" because it had been purchased for a busi-
ness purpose,34 and from that viewpoint could be considered "busi-
ness premises" of the employer.35 Proximity of the lodging to the
business area where the employee works was recognized by the court
as an important factor,36 and mere physical separation of the house
a' Presumably Congress had in mind the situation in Gunnar Van Rosen, 17 T.C.
834 (1952). There the employee ordinarily received free meals and lodging while at
sea aboard ship. When the ship happened to go into dry dock in the employee's
city of residence and quarters aboard ship were made unavailable by the repairs, he
lived in his own home some forty blocks away. Despite the fact that he was techni.
cally on twenty-four-hour call during the repair period, the court refused to allow
exclusion of lodging allowances which he received.
8 2 This approximates the definition worked out by a long line of decisions inter-
preting "premises" in the law of workmen's compensation. See I LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 15.41 (1964); 8 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 1714
(perm. ed. 1951).
. "In our view, . . . property owned by an employer within two short blocks of
a facility being managed by an employee who is required to be available on 24-hour
call for management of the employer's business, is . . . on the business premises of
the employer within the meaning of section 119, where the employee is required to
accept such lodgings for the convenience of the employer .... 42 T.C. at 417. (Em-
phasis added.)
2, The employer had purchased the house in order to move the taxpayer out of
the valuable, rent-producing motel rooms which he and his family had been occupy-
ing and still keep him close enough to the motel to perform his duties. Id. at 415-16.
5 Id. at 416-17.
s In discussing two prior cases, the court refers to "close proximity to or vicinity
of the area where the . . . work was being done." Id. at 416 (discussing George 1.
Stone, 32 T.C. 1021 (1959); William I. Olkjer, 32 T.C. 464 (1959)).
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from the business area was not deemed fatal. The court concluded
that even the Commissioner recognized that some separation was
allowable 37 and that to deny the exclusion under the facts of the
case would result in too restrictive an application of the statute.38
Although the extent to which Congress intended to broaden the
"convenience" rule is difficult to determine from the legislative his-
tory, there are cogent reasons for deciding that the rule should at
least cover the Anderson situation. If the "business premises" test
were applied in a limited sense, the decision to grant an exclusion
would rest solely upon fortuitous circumstances. If, for example,
the employer had purchased a house located on land bordering the
motel property, an exclusion would have been granted even under
a strict application of the "business premises" test.39 However, any
number of practical considerations might have militated. against
such a purchase,40 and the policy of the statute was clearly satisfied
87"Respondent's regulations state that 'the term "business premises," generally
means the place of employment of the employee.' By use of the word 'generally'
respondent apparently recognizes that under certain circumstances the place of em-
ployment might be separated somewhat from the living quarters." 42 T.C. at 416.
This reasoning seems to be erroneous. The statement in the Regulations quoted
above obviously comes from the Conference Committee Report. See text accompany-
ing note 20 supra. In making this statement, the Conference Committee was not
alluding to a separation between the place of employment and the quarters, but
rather to the difference between the terms "place of employment" and "business
premises." See H.R. REP. No. 2543, supra note 15, at 27; note 30 supra and accom-
panying text.
8842 T.C. at 417. Militating for a restrictive application of § 119 is the fact that
the policy of the exclusion has been vigorously attacked as an unfair erosion of the
tax base. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., ls1r SEss., TAX REvisioN
COMPENDIUM 322, 325-26, 334-35, 347-48 (Comm. Print 1959); Note, 3 Was. & MARY
L. REv. 166, 169-73 (1961). Despite these attacks, however, Congress has not amended
the section since its enactment.
"The examples given in the reports would seem to cover this situation. See notes
26 and 29 supra and accompanying text. In similar situations the Commissioner has
not even argued the point. See Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.),
modifying 29 T.C. 813 (1958) (hospital employee in separate building); Manuel G.
Setal, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 853 (1961) (mine worker in remote area furnished
lodging in camp); William I. Olkjer, 32 T.C. 464 (1959) (construction worker in
Greenland furnished lodging at job-site); Rodney E. Wolf, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
580 (1958) (cottage master at correctional institution).
A strict application of the business premises test would appear patently absurd
if the employer in Anderson could have satisfied such a test merely by purchasing a
narrow easement connecting the motel and the lodging.
"For example, adjoining land might not have been zoned for residences; or may
have been too expensive, simply unavailable, or otherwise less desirable economically.
It should be noted that all these possibilities refer to business considerations of the
employer and not to preferences of the employee.
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in spite of the physical separation.41 To contend that the "business
premises" test should be restrictively applied to facilitate administra-
tion would produce inequitable results.
The facts in other cases may present more difficult problems than
did Anderson. Suppose a distributor is provided rent-free lodging
which is not proximate to his employer's principal place of business,
but is centrally located within the area to which the distrib-
utor delivers. 42 Or take another example, suppose an employer
maintained two plants separated by several miles and his superin-
tendent, who was often needed at both plants on a 24-hour basis,
was provided with a house halfway between. 43 In both cases, the
"business premises" test appears to be met since the lodging serves
a business purpose of the employer and is proximate to the em-
ployee's place of work. Where the particular function of the em-
ployee becomes increasingly localized, however, the permissible area
of proximity shrinks accordingly.44 Thus, if a manufacturer needed
100 percent employee attendance for efficient operation of his fac-
tory, and required ,his employees to live in employer-owned apart-
ments for the purpose of providing company transportation, assum-
ing the apartments were somewhat removed from the place of
employment, the requisite proximity would be missing. As an addi-
tional consideration, it will be difficult in many situations for the
employee to satisfy the other two tests contained in section 119.
The liberal view taken by the Tax Court in Anderson produced
a palpable result under the facts of the case. However, the court
should have explained more adequately its construction of the am-
biguous "business premises" phrase. In line with Anderson, and
'
1 The facts in Anderson show that the employer purchased the closest piece of
property which was zoned for dwellings and built a house thereon, even though
property with a dwelling already constructed could have been purchased at only a
slightly greater distance from the motel. 42 T.C. at 412.
12See the similar situation in United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
"3 If business is conducted in the lodging itself, there is no problem in finding it
to be on the "business premises." See United States Junior Chamber of Commerce
v. United States, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (64-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9637 (Ct.
Cl. July 17, 1964).
"By the same token, where the particular function assumes larger geographic
proportions, centrally located lodging may cease to have a business purpose. Thus,
in the two previous examples, if the distributor drove a truck between New York
and Chicago, or if the superintendent's two factories were located in those two cities,
there is no evidence of a business purpose if the employer requires his employee
to live in lodging provided in Cleveland. On the other hand, if rent-free lodging is
provided in both New York and Chicago, the test would appear to be met.
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until further clarification is forthcoming from Congress or the Com-
missioner, the courts would do well to refrain from a restrictive,
technical application of the "business premises" test whenever the
"convenience" and "condition of employment" requirements are
clearly satisfied.
